World Watch Focus: A Policy for Iraq

20060322

     President Bush recently held a news conference where he spoke as frankly as he ever has about the ongoing operations in Iraq. While this news conference went a long way toward clarifying the administration’s policies on Iraq, the information just did not go far enough, either in substance or in direction.

     The greatest problem with the current policy in Iraq is that it does not accept the reality of the situation on the ground in Iraq. This statement is not an indictment of the liberation itself, troop levels, rebuilding, or any of the other policies typically criticized in the press and by politicians, rather it is a criticism of the fact that there are 200,000 non-Muslim, non-Arab troops trying to keep the peace in a very Muslim, very Arab country.

     Recent events in Iraq show that the problems in Iraq have turned a corner from the problems of a recently liberated nation fighting an insurgency led mostly by supporters of the deposed regime to the problems of a sectarian divide almost 1400 years old. While even this explanation is an oversimplification of the facts, it shows the core of the problem the US and coalition forces face in the future in Iraq.

     Therefore, any ongoing policy in Iraq must take into account the nature of the problems in Iraq, and as a result, it becomes immediately obvious that no foreign force can ever hope to intervene in a fight developed along sectarian lines. That fight and any intervention that is to stop it is a clearly Iraqi problem that must be approached with an Iraqi face and an Iraqi solution.

     This reality does not mean that the US should just withdraw from Iraq and leave the Iraqis to fend for themselves. Instead, this reality means that the US must adjust its current policies to meet the situation that exists. Such a policy is adaptation to changing circumstances rather than abandonment. This adapted policy should focus on three primary areas of concern: placing Iraqi forces at the forefront of operations inside Iraq, protecting critical infrastructure against further attack, and interdicting the flow of support of insurgent and sectarian forces from Iran and Syria.

     Various estimates have suggested that as many as 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces are secure enough that the Iraqi forces could take over day-to-day security. The reason this transition has not yet occurred is because there is still great concern over whether the Iraqi forces are sufficiently trained and over how much those forces have been compromised by infiltration. Simultaneously, there is significant evidence that when these same forces operate with small contingents of US or coalition forces embedded with them, they perform well, even with concerns about training and infiltration.

     The answer to turning security operations over to the Iraqis then seems to be to reassign the US forces in Iraq from a role of direct operations to one of supporting the operations of the Iraqi forces. In the more secure provinces, this role may well prove to be extremely small, while in the less secure provinces it will necessarily be larger. Overall, this model will inevitably reduce the US force commitment to direct combat operations, thereby freeing up assigned forces for other tasks. Additionally, the US forces assigned to the task of supporting the Iraqis can themselves be supported by the formation of more centralized- thereby more easily defended and less obtrusive- quick reaction forces for cases where the combine Iraqi-US forces are not enough.

     Adopting the stated security policy will then free up US and coalition forces for the second major focus, which is protecting the Iraqi critical infrastructure. The reason that the US rebuilding effort in Iraq seems to be less successful than it is in reality is because it is easy to disrupt large swaths of infrastructure by simply attacking it at critical points. The US forces freed up from direct combat operations can then be refocused toward a concerted effort to protect these critical infrastructure points, thereby improving the overall situation.

     Finally, and perhaps most importantly, redirecting US and coalition forces from direct combat operations to supporting operations will free up many valuable assets for the one operation that the US forces should and must direct their combat ability towards, and that is controlling the flow of support for the insurgency and sectarian forces from across Iraq’s Iranian and Syrian borders. If the US forces even double their presence along these borders, the effect on this flow would be staggering against those who currently benefit from it. With most of the US forces freed from direct combat requirements, the ability to control those borders could become almost absolute.

     Ultimately, the described policy would immediately accomplish several goals which would further help stabilize the situation in Iraq. First, it would reduce the effectiveness of the insurgency because they would no longer have Americans to fight. Second, it would reduce the religious irritation the presence of US forces causes- whether the US likes this fact or not- among the sectarian forces. Third, it would reduce the US forces exposure to combat situations, thereby reducing casualties and improving the image of the operations in Iraq. Finally, it would allow the US to recondition its forces, possibly reducing the overall troop commitment and allowing for an overall increase in US force flexibility due to a larger pool of uncommitted troops.

     This policy, however, does not question the validity of the purpose of the operations in Iraq nor the necessity of continuing those operations. Instead, it adapts that purpose to the current conditions in Iraq, allowing US and coalition forces to continue to perform the good and useful work that they have completed to this point. This policy redirects US forces to where they are needed, gives the Iraqis a greater role in providing for their own security and wellbeing, helps US forces avoid becoming entangled in a sectarian conflict, and provides the potential for an exit strategy from Iraq that must inevitably come.

DLH